

## Message Text

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NATO CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON

POLITICAL ANALYSIS: ROMANIA'S MODIFIED POSTURE TOWARD  
MOSCOW AND PEKING

1. ROMANIA'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND PEKING HAVE UNDER-  
GONE A SUBTLE YET NOTICEABLE CHANGE DURING THE LAST SIX  
MONTHS. BUCHAREST HAS CONTINUED TO STRESS ITS TIES TO AND  
COOPERATION WITH PEKING, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT HAS MADE AN  
EFFORT NOT TO FLAUNT ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PRC, AND HAS  
PLAYED UP THOSE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

2. ROMANIA HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANY SUBSTANTIVE CONCES-  
SIONS TO THE USSR, IN EITHER THE POLITICAL OR THE ECONOMIC  
FIELD, BUT IT HAS ADJUSTED SOME OF ITS RHETORIC. IN CON-  
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TRAST TO THE POSTURE THAT IT MAINTAINED FOR A DECADE,

ROMANIA, BEGINNING IN AUGUST 1974, HAS:

(A)--EMPHASIZED SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO ROMANIA'S LIBERATION; ,,,

(B)--STRESSED THE FACT THAT THE USSR IS ROMANIA'S NO. 1 TRADE PARTNER, EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO COOPERATIVE VENTURES WITH THE USSR AND TO INVEST IN RAW MATERIALS EXTRACTION IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND AGREED TO PURCHASE SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES;

(C)--CONCLUDED A NUMBER OF NEGOTIATIONS ON COLLABORATION IN THE CULTURAL AREA;

(D)--ACCORDED A MUCH WARMER TREATMENT IN ITS MEDIA TO ROMANIAN-SOVIET EXCHANGES AND TONED DOWN SOME FORMULATIONS IN ITS NEW PARTY PROGRAM THAT MOSCOW APPARENTLY FOUND OBJECTIONABLE.

3. SOME OF THESE ADJUSTMENTS WERE RELATIVELY MINOR. AT THE SAME TIME THEY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY ORCHESTRATED BY THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IN AN OBVIOUS EFFORT TO AVOID ANY STRAINING OF RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

4. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECIPROCATED BY GESTURES OF THEIR OWN:

(A)--SENDING KOSYGIN TO THE AUGUST 23RD ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS;

(B)--HAVING KIRILENKO HEAD THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE XITH PARTY CONGRESS;

(C)--PLAYING UP FOREIGN MINISTER MACOVESCU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND AGREEING TO INSERT IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT ROMANIA'S FAVORITE STATEMENT, WHICH AFFIRMS THAT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON: "PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, EQUAL RIGHTS, THE OBSERVANCE OF INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS."

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5. AT THE SAME TIME, ROMANIA HAS MADE AN EQUAL AND OBVIOUS EFFORT TO MODULATE ITS RELATIONS WITH PEKING. BUCHAREST AND PEKING ARE STILL COMPLIMENTING EACH OTHER, BUT POLITELY RATHER THAN FERVENTLY, WITH PEKING NOW THE ACTIVE SUITOR. SINCE THE MIDDLE OF 1974, APART FROM MACOVESCU'S VISIT TO PEKING, BALANCED BY THAT TO MOSCOW, AND AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY DIGNITARIES, THERE HAS BEEN A NOTABLE DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO

COUNTRIES.

6. THE SCALES SEEM TO HAVE TIPPED IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIETS. IT MAY BE THAT CEAUSESCU, HAVING CONSIDERED ROMANIA'S UNCERTAIN ECONOMIC HEALTH AS WELL AS THAT OF HIS WESTERN SUPPLIERS AND CUSTOMERS, HAS DECIDED THAT HE NEEDS THE USSR ENOUGH NOT TO ANTAGONIZE ITS LEADERS. HE MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED TO MAKE THIS DECISION BY:

(A)--THE IMPORTANCE OF THE USSR AS A SUPPLIER OF NEEDED RAW MATERIALS (I.E., IRON ORE AND COKE);

(B)--THE GROWING ECONOMIC RECESSION IN THE WEST;

(C)--THE INHERENT LIMITS OF THE CHINESE CONNECTION, IDEOLOGICALLY USEFUL AS IT MIGHT BE; AND

(D)--THE TURBULENCE GENERATED IN THE BALKANS BY THE CYPRUS CRISIS.

7. THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT CEAUSESCU'S FORTH-COMING TRIP TO THE FAR EAST AND TO SOME ARAB COUNTRIES WILL INCLUDE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO PEKING. WE THINK IT IS UN-LIKELY THAT CEAUSESCU WOULD RISK ANOTHER AGGRAVATION OF HIS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW BY SUCH A VISIT.

8. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT BUCHAREST IS REVERSING ITS FRIENDLY POSTURE TOWARD PEKING. RATHER IT APPEARS TO BE ADOPTING A LOWER PROFILE IN DEFERENCE TO SOVIET SENSIBILITIES.

9. ROMANIA STILL COURTS THE NONALIGNED COUNTRIES AS WELL AS THE WEST, BUT THIS POLICY IS ACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONTEXT OF DETENTE. IT IS THE SPECTER OF PEKING THAT HAUNTS THE SOVIET LEADERS. BY NOT FLAUNTING ROMANIA'S TIES WITH PEKING, CEAUSESCU CAN REASSURE THE SOVIETS THAT HIS STRAYING IS NOT FINAL. INGERSOLL

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